Rethinking counter-terrorism strategy in the Sahel

Solly Rakgomo | Monday June 12, 2023 06:00

Militant Islamist group violence against civilians in the Sahel represents 60% of all such violence in Africa and is projected to increase by more than 40% in 2023.

This uninterrupted escalation of violence has displaced more than 2.5 million people and is on pace to kill more than 10,000 individuals in 2023. Government control over the vast rugged territory has diminished over the years, revealing an inability to sustain pressure on militant Islamist groups and to provide security for communities.

Sahelian security forces have suffered heavy losses in the conflict. Militants have successfully targeted security and defence forces in their attacks throughout Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Superior mobility and intelligence capabilities have allowed the militant groups to overrun static military bases, resulting in hundreds of casualties among armed forces.

Military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, moreover, have diverted precious attention and resources from the fight, allowing militants to gain momentum and expand. According to the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, the conflicts in the Sahel are complex and cannot be reduced to any single factor and the deteriorating security environment, nevertheless, highlights the need to rethink, re-examine and recalibrate the strategy Sahelian countries employ for their security forces to confront this growing threat.

At its core, this requires recognising that Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger face local insurgencies rather than isolated terrorist threats. Consequently, reshaping security forces specifically for counter insurgency is paramount to stabilising the Sahel region.

David Lingola says that this implies several important changes with respect to military capabilities, doctrine, and force structure as well as the place of armies in the larger context of justice and law enforcement.

There is a deep need for Sahelian states affected by violent extremism to develop a counterinsurgency/terrorism strategic orientation, which is a first step in assessing a security strategy and understanding the threat. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are threatened by disparate violent extremist groups mobilised by distinctive geographic, ethnic, ideological, and political motivations.

Although these groups are often characterised as belonging to one of two overarching banners, the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nasrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), the Sahelian militants are less extensions of global terrorist organisations than expressions of local conflicts. These militant groups are led by charismatic and politically minded local spoilers who channel and exploit local grievances related to perceived injustice, political marginalisation, ethnic discrimination, and poverty. Some people are receptive to jihadist narratives because of genuine weaknesses of Sahelian governments, which have been characterised as neglectful at best, abusive at worst. Sahelians often perceive their countries’ limited justice systems as slow and venal. And there is a perception of broad impunity with respect to abuses, injustice, and corruption. Given the local, societally-based nature of the security threat in the Sahel, Lingola advises that shifting the strategic orientation guiding Sahelian armed forces to counterinsurgency (COIN) is warranted. However, this requires a population-centric approach, which means limiting as much as possible the application of violence. It also entails complementing military action with initiatives to improve living conditions as well as the provision of justice and law enforcement. In short, Lingola reasons that a successful COIN demands a different kind of military and governance strategy. These basic premises of COIN require capabilities that enable militaries to interact with local communities and build positive relationships.

These relationships are essential, as are the respect for the law of war and rule of law. It might be an exaggeration to say it is more important that soldiers learn to be model citizens than be proficient at combat tactics, but only just. Effective African security forces must enjoy the acceptance and trust of the people they protect and serve. This means that Sahelian armies must be “republican” in the sense of representing the values of the nation they defend. The imperative for good relations with the population also has concrete implications for recruitment and fostering a diverse force that reflects society. Diversity presents challenges related to cohesion. However, fostering cohesion among diverse formations can enhance the military’s capabilities while also reinforcing its republican qualities. Military justice is also a key component. The gendarmeries nationales that are common in Francophone Africa play a central role by straddling the military and law enforcement. Gendarmeries typically police civilian populations and have a provost function, meaning they monitor the armed forces. The gendarmeries and police should be equipped with the necessary staff and resources to address complaints of human rights violations. At the very least, this should help reduce instances of security forces abusing civilians, which are not only counterproductive but also a boon for insurgents’ recruitment. Upholding human rights also strengthens government legitimacy. Specified troops might be designated “human rights referents” for an operation, which would make them responsible for ensuring that the provisions of armed conflict and international humanitarian law are observed. There is also a need to integrate civilian teams at the battalion level to identify problems related to governance as well as opportunities for mobilising the population’s support, similarly, improve COIN efforts. These teams help ensure that the government acts on matters related to policing, infrastructure, health care, education, agriculture, and veterinary services, effectively responding to the interests and needs of local populations. These teams are often the first to arrive with the capacity to respond to civilians’ needs and operate as a vanguard of government services. In doing so, they lay a foundation for a new social contract that can tilt the balance of trust back toward the government in counterinsurgency conflicts. General Oumarou Namata Gazama, the Nigérien commander of the G5 Sahel Joint Force in 2019-2021, coined the term “fairgrounds missions’ in reference to efforts toward this goal. The idea was for civil administrators, medical teams, and development experts to accompany military operations to re-implant an embryo of the state in areas where it had not been operational. This strategic re-orientation is encouraged by the reluctance by governments in this region to deal with Sahelian domestic socio-economic problems, which amounts to a concentration on combat operations often to the neglect of the noncombat side of a population-centric approach. It is for this reason that the paradigm switch to counterinsurgency is important. It is very important for Sahelian states and others across the continent of Africa not just about combat skills but also the restoration of community trust in government.