Many African states have unresolved conflicts that in turn perpetuate internal and external displacement of millions of people. There are 13 African countries facing major armed conflict, and they account for almost 90% of more than 25 million people displaced by conflict and persecution on the continent. In recent years, Africa has hosted more than a third of the world’s conflicts and around 35% of all persons displaced as a result.
This displacement figure represents both the accumulated effect of long, drawn-out conflicts as well as the sudden surge of displacement seen in new crises. In some cases, it is a combination of the two.
Rather than dissipating over time, long unresolved conflicts produce repeated waves of displacement. The upward trend in forced displacement since 2005 can be largely attributed to such protracted conflicts whose effects bleed into the surrounding region. Notably, there are regional concentrations of conflict (and displacement) in the Great Lakes, the Sudans, Somalia, and the Lake Chad Basin. The contiguous pattern of conflict in Africa, moreover, means that the prospects of finding refuge in neighbouring countries are often unlikely.
The population movement caused by political and structural drivers creates a spectrum of security implications ranging from the immediate humanitarian costs and empowerment of militant groups to the long-term socio-economic consequences for the millions of affected households and the regions attempting to absorb those displaced. Crisis of displacement also bolsters criminal networks to manipulate the desperate situation faced by the displaced with impunity. For example, people travelling without proper documentation understand the threat of being deported by the authorities and therefore are less likely to seek assistance when in trouble.
This opens the door to abuse, be it in the form of corrupt authorities demanding a bribe under threat of arrest or duplicitous human smugglers. Many of the passages that go through the Maghreb-Sahel region, for example, are pre-existing smuggling routes for arms, displaced people and contraband and are popular, precisely because they have little effective state oversight. Having so much money floating along these routes attracts not just criminal elements but those who rely on the threat of violence to take control of a particular route, trade, or local community. This has direct consequences for security in the affected country and region. While the amount of illicit income generated from migration to Europe is inherently difficult to determine, estimates are that human smuggling of the displaced people along the Trans-Sahara route including Libya alone, is worth up to $765 million annually according to the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies.
A significant share of these resources is making its way into the hands of criminals, insurgents, and violent extremist groups who operate in a region that includes Algeria, Libya, Chad, Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. For example, the resources of persons travelling irregularly to the Libyan coast are enriching the many Libyan tribal militias and local officials who have been implicated in the warehousing and exploitation of displaced migrants for labour. One Libyan militia commander sanctioned by the United Nations was the leader of a transnational trafficking network working directly with terror groups, including a long-standing relationship with the Islamic State (ISIS).
ISIS, in turn, has a well-documented record of human smuggling and trafficking of displaced persons, abuse, exploitation, and murder of sub-Saharan Africans in Libya. As the market for human smuggling has expanded, more criminal actors have become involved, and some have been incorporated into international networks. The growing phenomenon of smuggling networks emanating from Libya have also contributed to instability and insecurity across the Maghreb and Sahel. While human smuggling is often depicted as providing migrants alternative paths of transit, human trafficking involves moving people against their will to then profit off them either via labour or ransom. When displaced people are trafficked, unlike people travelling of their own free will, they do not send remittances back to their home countries.
In effect, the victim’s family, community, and country lose out on their earning potential. Furthermore, the criminal activity and corruption associated with trafficking of displaced people undermine domestic stability and the rule of law. This is in addition to high human cost. This is because under threat from conflict, people flee with little to nothing of their possessions. Among the displaced are merchants and traders, their displacement severing the ties that connect these communities with regional markets, accelerating economic decline and inhibiting recovery. After conflict, investment tends to dry up for years and sometimes decades. John Seegle laments the fact that a single year of civil war is estimated to reduce a country’s economic growth by about two percent and its neighbours by about 0.7 percent of their GDP.
The vast majority of people fleeing conflict, importantly, stay within their countries (Internally Displaced People - IDP). Of those who leave their country (refugees), most flee to the nearest accessible border and stop their flight there. In other words, their primary objective is to get out of harm’s way. The implication is that forced displacement is a regional problem where border towns bear the bulk of the burden. IDP, refugees, and hosting authorities often anticipate that the displacement will only be temporary. However, failing the timely resolution of the political crisis that has caused the displacement, IDP and refugee populations tend to persist.
The average duration of exile for refugees globally today stands at 10.3 years and for IDP it can be as long as two decades. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, of the more than seven million refugees on the continent, around 60% live in camps and a few countries, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and the DRC are hosting the lion’s share of refugees. Hosting displaced populations (be they refugees or IDP) for long periods of time is problematic for numerous reasons. Not only are a hosting community’s resources severely strained, but the coping strategies of the displaced are likewise stretched thin if not broken. Once they have missed their harvests or planting seasons, the displaced are dependent on others for at least another year. The cycle spirals downward. Often, governments turn to humanitarian organisations to assist.
But with many crises dragging on year after year, donor fatigue dries up resources and both the displaced and host governments face severe strains for years. As the pressure on host communities builds, the potential destabilising effects expand. For example, as the South Sudan crisis endures, the risks of instability in northern Uganda, a region with its own legacy of strife, will escalate. Similar patterns can be seen as a result of political crises in Burundi, Central African Republic, the DRC, and Somalia.
Large settlements of people displaced within and across borders by protracted intrastate conflicts may also become targets or recruiting grounds for rebel groups, gangs, violent extremist groups or other illicit actors. This is especially a risk when the displacement is perceived to have an inter-communal dimension, creating a defining identity within the victimised group and a lever for recruitment by sympathetic actors. To the extent that this displacement crosses borders, it may also draw in neighbouring countries fuelling extended regional instability, as arguably has been the case for years in the Great Lakes region. All in all, the crisis of displacement is a serious security issue in the African continent that needs immediate attention.
