Some attribute the rise in military coups to a lack of strong security oversight institutions thus hampering efforts to improve military professionalism.
It is worrisome that nine military coups d’état in seven countries since 2020 underscore the continued politicisation and lack of professionalism plaguing certain defence forces.
In each case, despite pledging to return political power to civilians, the military juntas have repeatedly extended their timelines for political transition, exacerbating the socio- economic strains on the citizenry. In Sudan, for example, the unwillingness of the military to allow a democratic transition has resulted in an implosion of the security sector and State collapse.
African governments rank among the weakest in terms of arresting corruption in the security sector, which diminishes public trust in government and threatens national and regional security. Roughly half of all security sectors rated by Transparency International as facing critical or very high levels of risk of corruption are African.
As a way of addressing this deficit in the governance of the security sector, Brigadier General Professor Dan Kuwali suggests the building of strong institutional oversight on security sector governance in many African states.
Kuwali serves as a commandant of the Malawi National Defence College as well as being an Extraordinary Professor of International Law at the University of Pretoria. Kuwali rightly points out that public accountability and transparency are key challenges for African security sectors as many African countries continue to lack effective legislative oversight of the security sector, thus sapping security forces from fulfilling their mission. He argues that without effective accountability of the security sector, impunity and unprofessionalism have flourished, degrading the capabilities of security forces.
The engagement of security officials in illicit activities, abuses against civilian populations, and politicisation further undermine the effectiveness of African security actors and this has directly contributed to greater instability and threats to citizen security, Kuwali asserts. Kuwali laments the fact that the record of security sector reform across the continent remains checkered and in some cases, militaries have resisted reforms, curbing the effectiveness of oversight and accountability mechanisms.
I fully concur with Kuwali that in cases where the military holds either de jure or de facto political power, this presents highly problematic situations as political interference by defence and security forces effectively renders mechanisms of oversight and accountability toothless. When defence and security officials prioritise protecting their political agenda or those of ruling cliques mired in corruption rather than citizens’ security interests, security forces themselves become a threat. In order to address these anomalies, Kuwali calls for African states to build strong democratic security sector governance based on the principle that legitimacy to govern derives from elected civilian leaders who then have the authority to set priorities for the security sector.
Security actors, in turn, derive their authority from their subordination to this legitimate civilian leadership. He stresses that in such an environment, the rule of law becomes a core element of democratic security sector governance founded on the principle that no one is above the law.
From what Kuwali has posited, one can safely argue that effective security sector governance requires a system of checks and balances where vibrant legislatures and independent judiciaries provide the necessary oversight to hold authorities accountable to citizens, including in the domain of defence and security.
This therefore means that effective security sector oversight helps ensure that the solemn responsibility of security actors to bear arms is used in the interests of society. In addition, as Kuwali tells us, democratic security sector governance is also based on the principle of transparency and this therefore calls for role and rationale for security actors in providing citizen security to be clearly articulated. This helps in building popular support for the security sector while providing a basis to assess how well security actors are achieving their missions.
Accountability of the security sector entails that security organisations must be answerable to those institutions legally mandated to oversee their activities. It also means that oversight institutions must have enforcement mechanisms for breaches and compliance by security organisations. Accountability, therefore, ensures that defence and security forces do not benefit from impunity due to their positions of power within society.
Kuwali further advises that it is very important for the media to play a key role in the oversight of the security sector by raising awareness of the responsibilities and performance of security organisations in the discharge of their constitutional functions as well as drawing attention to areas of reform. The media, human rights organisations, and security policy analysts can track behaviour, draw attention to deviations from national and international law and good practices, and make suggestions on ways of improving accountability.
As a parting shot, one can also state that oversight and accountability of the security sector ensures that government can manage security organisations effectively and efficiently. In doing so, it builds citizen trust in the defence and security forces. In addition, professionalism of the security sector should be guided by the principles of subordination to democratic civilian authority, allegiance to the constitution, commitment to political neutrality, and an ethical institutional culture.
