Temporarily abandoned by his BagaMmanaana and Bangwaketse allies the Mokwena's position must have initially appeared desperate. From their later reports it is clear that in the immediate aftermath of the battle both he and Scholtz were painfully aware of their losses, but uncertain of the status of their opponent's forces.
On August 31, 1852, Scholtz dispatched scouting parties to probe the now divided enemies’ strength and positions. It was during this period that his men broke into Livingstone's unoccupied Kolobeng mission where they reported: "We found several half-finished guns and a gunmaker's shop with an abundance of tools. We here found more guns and tools than Bibles, so that the place had more the appearance of a gunmaker's shop than a mission station, and more a smuggling shop than a school place." Meanwhile, Kgosi Senthufe had regrouped the Bangwaketse at Kanye's Kgwakgwe hill, from where they successfully repulsed the Boers.
Only a few details survive about the engagement. The Commandant-General’s official campaign report (as edited and re-drafted by Andries Pretorius) neglects to mention the incident, while Scholtz himself, in a September 12, 1852 letter states: "I also made an attack on [the Bangwaketse Kgosi] Senthufe, but there was no time to do this properly." The incident is also acknowledged in other contemporary letters and newspaper accounts as well as Sengwaketse traditions. From an article published in the Cape-Town Mail of March 12.1853: "They [the Boers] then proceeded to the residence of Sentulie [Senthufe], a neighbouring chief; and on the way, fell in with detached parties of Moselili's tribe [Kgosi Mosielele's Bakgatla bagaMmanaana], who were endeavouring to make their escape with their wives, children, and cattle. These wretched people they shot down in the most cold-blooded manner - they offering no resistance whatever, but, on the contrary wishing to surrender. "Here the Boers enriched themselves with numbers of cattle, women, and children. Sentulie, having sent as many of his woman and children as he could to the mountains for safety, awaited the arrival of the Boers, who immediately opened a heavy fire. His men then also fled to the mountains [atop Kgwakgwe hill]; on gaining which they returned fire on the Boers, who then retreated. Here alone, it appears, they did not succeed in obtaining any cattle or captives." The Bangwaketse stand at Kgwakgwe may have been decisive in convincing the Boers that the fighting spirit of their opponents remained unbroken.
Their subsequent failure to attack Dithubaruba suggests that the prospect of charging up hills in the face of Batswana gunfire had lost its appeal. The Boers got within sight of the Sechele’s fortifications only to turn back. Some Sekwena accounts have long credited the Boer retreat to the giant aloe forest west of Molepolole on the road to Dithubaruba. They maintain that upon seeing the forest on the horizon at dusk, the Boers mistook the tall plants for mephato, thus believing that Sechele had mobilised thousands of fresh troops. In this respect, the silhouettes of the aloe leaves are said to have resembled the ostrich plumed headdress of the Bakwena warriors.
It is also alleged that the great Mokwena used some of his much-feared magic to create the illusion. It is at least as likely that it was the actual sight of the walled trenches along the steep eastern slope of Dithubaruba that ultimately discouraged the invaders. Transvaal Boer's invasion of Botswana finally collapsed on Thursday, September 2, 1852. On the said evening, the Boer Commandant-General, Piet Scholtz, convened a War Council to put forward his strategy for a renewed assault on Dithubaruba.
But his men turned down the plan and instead voted to return home. Unlike most past and present armies, the Voortrekker commandos had a democratic right to collectively overrule their Commandants. On Friday, September 3, 1852, the Boer Commando began its’ withdrawal from Botswana. They took with them 143 captive women and children and a large number of cattle. Additional property belonging to Bakwena and English traders was also seized and later auctioned. The Boers had failed, however, in their primary mission of subjugating the local population. As they withdrew, Batswana harassed them with hit-and-run attacks. For the Boers, the invasion had been a failure. According to most sources, 36 Boers died during the invasion. While the Batswana losses were higher, with at least 89 dead, they had succeeded in preserving their independence.
During the withdrawal, Scholtz reported to Pretorius: "I must regretfully inform you that I have been obliged to disband the commando, owing partly to the weakness of horse and oxen and partly to opposition among the men...moreover I greatly fear, since I cannot keep the commando intact to accomplish anything, that the Marico district will be unsafe...things have not worked out to my liking." Scholtz's concern proved to be well-founded. In the months that followed, Batswana launched retaliatory raids into the Transvaal's Marico District.
